The Effects of Belief in God and Science on Acute Stress
Why do people believe in God(s)? One explanation is that faith allows people to cope with life's stresses by providing meaning to their circumstances. Knowing that the world is organized and commanded by a powerful, benevolent being can comfort the believer (Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan, & Laurin, 2008) . Indeed, correlational studies suggest a negative association between religious faith and stress-related illness, including cardiovascular disease and high blood pressure (Chida, Steptoe, & Powell, 2009; Gartner, Larson, & Allen, 1991; Koenig, 2008; Powell, Shahabi, & Thoresen, 2003) , and a positive association with psychological adjustment to stress (Ano & Vasconcelles, 2005) . Moreover, experimental studies indicate that exposure to stressful stimuli leads religious individuals to strengthen their belief in God (Norenzayan & Hansen, 2006; Vail, Arndt, & Abdollahi, 2012) .
Intriguingly, the stress-buffering effect of faith is not limited to religion: When faced with stress and uncertainty, non-religious people also cling to meaningful belief systems, notably belief in science (Farias, Newheiser, Kahane, & de Toledo, 2013; Rutjens, van Harreveld, van der Pligt, Kreemers, & Noordewier, 2013) .
Despite these suggestive findings, a key question remains unexplored: Does belief in God (or science) in fact allow people to better regulate acute stress? We examined this question experimentally by using an acute stress induction task in which participants are asked to engage in public speaking in front of a panel that will judge their performance (i.e., the Trier Social Stress Test; Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer, 1993) . Fortuitously, we conducted the study a few months before a socio-political situation that affected an entire nation -Brexit, the June 2016 referendum in which the United Kingdom (UK) voted to leave the European Union (EU). Thus, we asked participants to prepare their public speaking task focusing on arguments for or against Brexit. We hypothesized that religious belief, and possibly also belief in science, would offer individuals a way of regulating their stress responses, such that believers in religion and science would experience less acute stress when prompted (vs. not prompted) to reflect on their beliefs. We measured stress at both subjective and physiological levels.
Method

Participants and Design
All data were collected before the Brexit vote took place. We recruited 51 religious individuals (all were students) and 49 non-religious scientists (all were postgraduate-level students in a science discipline) from two British universities (total N=100; 52 women; mean age=25. 67, SD=5.62, 1 ) and measured their responses during a stress induction task (the Trier Social Stress Test; Kirschbaum et al., 1993) . The study received university ethics approval under the title "The role of belief in coping with social stress". To recruit two relatively homogeneous groups of religious and science believers, we advertised an experiment entitled "Individual Differences in Stress Responses" for "Religious Believers"
and "Scientists" separately (Looking for Religious Believers or Looking for Scientists). We then pre-screened participants via email by asking them to answer questions about their beliefs and religious practices. To be included in the religious sample, participants had to score 5 or higher on a single item assessing religiosity (How religious do you consider yourself to be?; 1=not religious at all to 7=very religious); to report belief in God or something divine (To what extent do you believe that God, deities, or something divine exists?; 1=not at all to 7=very much so); and to report praying and attending religious services regularly (at least one to three times per month). To be included in the scientist sample, participants had to be postgraduate-level students in a science discipline and score 3 or lower on the religiosity item, to score not very much or not at all on the belief in God/divine being item, and to report rarely or never attending religious services or praying.
Further eligibility criteria for all participants included not taking heart medication or any other medication that might affect cardiovascular or salivary cortisol responses (e.g., antidepressants) and having no blood pressure or heart problems. Finally, all participants were instructed to refrain from smoking, consuming alcohol and caffeine, and vigorous exercise for at least three hours prior to participation.
Prior to undergoing stress induction, participants were randomly assigned to the belief or control conditions, and completed a brief writing task. In the belief condition (N=51), A scientist participant in the belief condition wrote:
"I find learning about science relaxing, especially about animals, dinosaurs or fossils.
This year's new year resolution was when stressed or depressed to start at the bottom of the tree of life and work up it, learn a little bit until I feel a bit better and then stop.
I'm not sure what it is about zoology in general that I find so calming."
Procedure and Measures
The study was conducted by two research assistants who advertised the study, prescreened and recruited all participants, and conducted all procedures. One of the research assistants met each pre-screened participant at the reception of the psychology department and escorted the participant to the testing room. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions, with the experimenter remaining blind to condition. Random assignment was implemented by having survey packets for the belief and control conditions intermixed in separate piles for religious and scientist participants. We followed the standard procedure for the Trier Social Stress Test (Kirschbaum et al., 1993) , and included subjective measures of affect (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) , stress (Cohen, Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 1983) , and state anxiety (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983 ) that have been well validated and are used frequently with both general and clinical populations.
The procedure consisted of the following steps: (1) Upon arrival, heart rate (HR) and systolic and diastolic blood pressure (BP) were measured; these data were not analyzed, as the purpose was simply to familiarize participants with cardiovascular measurement. (2) Participants watched a 10-minute nature video to induce relaxation. HR and BP were assessed at 8 and 10 minutes (averaged into baseline cardiovascular function). At 10 minutes, participants provided a saliva sample (for baseline cortisol). (3) Participants completed the 20-item State Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al., 1983 ; e.g., "I am tense"; α=.93 in the present sample at this baseline measurement) and the 10-item Perceived Stress Scale (PSS; Cohen et al., 1983 ; e.g., "I feel unable to cope with all of the things I have to do"; α=.85 in the present sample at this baseline measurement), using scales anchored at 1
(not at all) and 6 (very much) and answering in terms of how they felt "at this moment." (4) Participants spent five minutes writing about their belief in science/religion or favorite season, depending on condition, after which we measured HR and BP (cardiovascular
function during writing). (5) Participants completed the 20-item Positive and Negative Affect
Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988) . Neither positive (α=.91 in the present sample) nor negative mood (α=.78 in the present sample) differed as a function of experimental condition, participant type, or their interaction, ps>.15. (6) Participants were informed they would have five minutes to prepare a speech in which they were to discuss arguments for and against the UK leaving the EU (i.e., stress induction). They were told the speech would be given in front of three judges and that they would be audio-recorded for later analysis (see the Appendix for full text of the instructions given to participants). (7) were debriefed and informed they would not need to give the speech. Finally, participants completed two 10-item measures assessing belief in science (e.g., "Science is the most efficient means of attaining truth"; =.91 in the present sample) and religious belief (e.g., "Without religion my life would have little meaning"; =.97 in the present sample; with 1=strongly disagree and 6=strongly agree; from Farias et al., 2013) . Variation in degrees of freedom reported below is due to missing data.
Results
Participant Characteristics
As part of a demographic questionnaire completed at the beginning of the study, participants reported their religious affiliation (free-response item). All 51 participants in the religious sample reported having a religious affiliation (29 participants reported being Christian, 7 reported being Catholic, 1 reported being orthodox Christian, 1 reported being Buddhist, 6 reported being Hindu, and 7 reported being Muslim). Among the 49 scientist participants, 15 (31%) reported being atheist and 22 (45%) reported having no religious affiliation. Three scientist participants reported being Christian, 2 reported being Catholic, 4
reported being Hindu, 1 reported being spiritual, 1 reported being both Christian and atheist, and 1 did not respond to this item.
Given that self-reporting a religious affiliation does not necessarily denote being was higher after the stress task than at baseline; this difference was greater among scientists than religious participants (see Figure 1) . The same analysis on perceived stress revealed only a main effect of Time, F(1, 89)=11.53, p=.001, η 2 p=.12. All other effects were nonsignificant, ps>.13. Perceived stress was higher after the stress task than at baseline (see Figure 1 ). Stress) mixed-model ANOVA on heart rate (see Figure 2) cortisol was higher in the control (vs. belief) condition but did not vary due to stress induction, F<1.
Cardiovascular Responses
Discussion
For over a century, psychologists have argued that religion provides people with meaning and can thus help alleviate everyday stress. More recently, it has been suggested that science can also be an effective source of meaning, serving as a surrogate belief system for non-religious individuals (Farias et al., 2013; Sagan & Druyan, 2006 ). Here, we tested for the first time whether believers in God or science can use their faith to down-regulate acute stress. We found strong evidence that our stress induction procedure was successful:
Subjective measures of state anxiety and perceived stress increased reliably during stress induction, as did cardiovascular indexes of stress. Contrary to predictions, however, we found no differences between participants in the belief condition, who had been prompted to reflect on their belief in God or science, and those in the control condition. This pattern remained the same when we excluded data from scientist participants who also reported having a religious affiliation, providing a cleaner separation of our two participant samples and bolstering the interpretation of the null effect of experimental condition. We did observe that religious participants as a whole (i.e., regardless of which experimental condition they were in) were somewhat less reactive to stress induction than were scientists. Specifically, increases in heart rate and state anxiety were sharper after the Brexit-related stress induction among scientists (vs. religious participants).
We acknowledge that a key limitation of studies of this kind, in which the goal is to compare two separate groups of participants with contrasting belief systems, is that belief systems are not tight physical entities. To recruit a homogeneous group of religious believers who would not believe in science at all, we would have had to look for Christian religious fundamentalist and anti-science types of believer, a rather difficult task in contemporary Western Europe. In fact, our sample of religious believers had a moderate level of belief in science, which is to be expected given that they were university students. Another methodological limitation concerns the use of a societally relevant political topic for the public speaking (i.e., stress induction) task, which to the best of our knowledge has not been done before. Although we believe that the greatest stressor in the present study was the expectation of having to complete a public speaking task, we were not able to assess potential individual differences among our participants on how strongly they felt about the topic of Brexit, nor did we measure individual differences in terms of public speaking skills or stress related to public speaking in general. However, it is plausible that the random assignment to conditions we employed would have alleviated the impact of otherwise potentially significant individual differences.
Despite people's inclination to seek out faith especially during stressful times in their lives, our study showed no evidence that activating belief in God or science allowed participants to down-regulate stress at either subjective or physiological levels. This null effect in our experimental design contrasts with large correlational and quasi-experimental literatures describing the stress-buffering effects of religious belief (Edmondson et al., 2005; Lawler & Younger, 2002; Masters & Knestel, 2011) . Perhaps it is not religious belief per se, but rather the larger complex of religious practices, affect, and social support that helps believers cope with stress. Alternatively, the stressor we used, preparing to publicly address the complex socio-political issues surrounding Brexit, may have had a particularly depleting effect on participants. Future work will be able to shed light on whether belief may have a more potent buffering effect on different stressors. Another possibility is that whereas momentary activation of belief did not mitigate acute stress in our study, having faith or participating in faithful practices may provide people with resources to cope with ongoing, chronic everyday stress.
Additionally, we note that belief in science and religious belief both represent multifaceted, complex belief systems. Specific elements of each belief system may be differentially relevant to acutely stressful situations that involve uncertainty and uncontrollability, like the situation in which our participants found themselves. That is, perhaps it is not a general belief system that enables down-regulation of acute stress, but rather it may be that more specific elements of one's beliefs serve this function. For example, threats to perceived control have been shown to increase belief in a controlling god (but not in a god as a creator), perhaps allowing people to thereby compensate for their personal lack of control (Kay et al., 2008) . Analogously, scientific theories that postulate the existence of stages of development may more effectively compensate for perceived lack of personal control, relative to scientific theories that do not involve steps or stages (Rutjens et al., 2013) .
It is therefore possible that, had our participants been given the opportunity to reflect on their beliefs after (rather than before) stress induction, they might have been able to selectively consider dimensions of their beliefs that would have more directly helped alleviate the form of stress they were experiencing. Future research may productively consider the effects of changing the order of the tasks employed in the present paradigm in order to assess whether participants indeed can and do draw on distinct aspects of their belief systems when they are aware of the exact nature of the acute stressor they are facing, and whether that specificity allows them to better down-regulate their responses.
With a variety of intriguing questions remaining unanswered, the present study suggests that when people are not able to exactly anticipate the specific nature of an upcoming acute stressor before it is encountered (arguably the way in which the majority of acute stressors are experienced in everyday life), having reflected on their beliefs immediately prior to stress induction does not appear to buffer them against the subjective and physiological impact of the stressful experience. Do the faithful truly have an advantage over those without faith, or does belief provide a mere semblance of meaning and control?
We encourage additional research on these important questions. Your task in this experiment is to do a presentation in front of a committee of three judges.
You will have 5 minutes to mentally prepare for this. You will have to present 3 different arguments for and against the following question: "Should the UK leave the European Union?" You will start with the reasons for this to happen and move on to reasons against.
You should articulate your reasons to the committee of judges in a clear and convincing way.
The members of the committee will analyse your speech and behaviour and will take notes while you speak, judging on fluency, effectiveness of arguments, and confidence of delivery.
Your voice will also be recorded by microphone for later analysis. The committee will then ask questions about your arguments. Your presentation will last no longer than five minutes; after this time, you will be asked to stop.
